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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
GEORGE DAVID MELLEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15528 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with the crimes of 
Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Sexual Assault, two First Degree 
Felonies, and entered a plea of not guilty and filed a "lotice of 
Intent to rely on the defense of insanity. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
sitting with a jury, on October 11 and October 12, 1977. Verdicts 
of guilty as charged on each count were returned by the jury. On 
Gctober 28, 1977, judgment was entered and the defendant was sentenced 
to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not less than 
'.ive years nor more than life, the sentence for each offense to run 
concurrently with each other. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction and a n~ 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 13, 1977, Tamara Fay Shields was walking along 
the street in Salt Lake City and the defendant approached her in hi: 
car and asked her if she needed a ride (R. 89, 90, 92) . Miss Shiel: 
testified that she was pulled by the hand into appellant's automobi> 
and appellant then drove her very near her home, came almost to a 
complete stop directly across the street from her home, and then mac; 
a U turn and sped away, grabbed her by the neck, threatened her wit: 
I 
death, and forced her to perform fellatio (R. 93, 96, 97, 98). Thi; 1 
all occurred inside the automobile in a location not exactly known :I 
Miss Shields but thereafter appellant took her back to her home and I 
let her out (R. 103). 
Appellant spoke with Detective Pat Smith of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department on July 18, 1977, and confessed to the police: 
that he had 11.ired Tamara Fay Shields into his automobile and then '..·1 
her to perform a sexual act (R. 112). 
Appellant relied on the defense of insanity and presented 
psychiatric testimony from Dr. James Whitten, who was appointed by:·t 
Court (R. 12, 18). Dr. Whitten, a psychiatrist, testified that he .oi 
met with appellant on August 8, 1977, pursuant to court order, and :I 
he diagnosed appellant as an acute and chronic paranoid schizophrer:. 
and gave as his opinion that at the time of the interview and at t:' 
time of the offense, appellant lacked capacity to be responsi~le 
- 2 -
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his actions, lacked capacity of knowing whether what he did was right 
or wrong. 
Appellant proffered testimony as to the defense of 
insanity which was excluded by the Court (R. 164-174). 
Appellant testified in a bizarre manner and said that he had 
lied to his attorney, doctors who had examined him, police, and he did 
so and so testified in part to confuse the jury and make people think 
~e was "crazy" (R. 183-191). 
In rebuttal the State presented the testimony of a 
osychiatrist, Dr. Van Austin, who testified that when appellant was 
examined in the month of June, 1977, he was found to be competent to 
stand trial and no evidence was found of mental disease or defect 
in June, 1977, or in March, 1977. Based upon the foregoing the jury 
rejected the defense of insanity and found appellant guilty 
of Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Sexual Assault. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED ERROR BY QUESTIONING A WITNESS 
AND TAKING AN ADVERSARIAL ROLE ON A KEY ISSUE IN TRIAL. 
During defendant's case he presented evidence on the issue 
oi '~insanity. Dr. James Whitten was called and examined by appellant, 
:::oss-examined by counsel for the State (R. 131-147) and was then 
examined further by appellant on re-direct examination. Following all 
;f that the Court questioned the witness as follows: (R. 150) 
THE COURT: I take it, Doctor, that you make your 
- 3 -
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diagnosis of the mental state of an individual based 
on his behavior pattern at a certain time as to what 
he says and what he does in your experience, is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct, mostly his thinking at that time. 
THE COURT: So, if we were to look back to March 
the 13th, what he says and does at that time would be 
in his behavioral pattern, and that's what you would 
have to base your opinion on? 




And schizophrenic goes in cycles, does 
A. Characteristically. 
THE COURT: Characteristically and they are responsible 
at times, is that correct? 
A. Quite. 
THE COURT: And at times they do know the difference 
between right and wrong and can choose the right from 
the wrong? 
A. Absolutely so. 
THE COURT: So, it depends upon the behavior pattern 
at any particular time that you're trying to examine 
as to whether or not he would be responsible. 
A. That's correct. 
THF COURT: Thank you, Doctor. You're excused. 
Such questioning was done in the presence of the jury. 
Appellant moved for a mistrial based upon the questioning I 
the Court on the basis that the Court was taking an adversarial ro> 
in the trial (R. 176, 177). The motion was denied (R. 178). 
Appellant contends that such questicning by the Court fa'::i 
the prosecution and hindered appellant's claim and defense of insar.:1 
This Court has dealt with such an issue in State v. Tuggle, 28 Uta'I 
284, 501 P. 2d 636 (1972). In that case this Court quoted the Cane: 
- 4 -
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.Jf Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association and held that 
questioning by the Court was not error in that case. It was pointed 
out that the prosecutor was new and inexperienced and the questions 
che Court framed were done in the interest of saving time. The Court 
said it was preferrable for a trial judge to refrain from interfering 
·•ith the orderly examination of witnesses but in that case there was 
no error. 
In appellant's case the matter is not so simple. From the 
cross-examination which takes up sixteen pages of transcript it is 
obvious that the prosecutor was not new and inexperienced and it is 
obvious from the entire examination of Dr. Whitten that the questions 
were not neutrally framed and did not clear up any issues but instead 
helped to point out that Dr. Whitten' s examination in August was less 
than reliable in determining a mental state at the time of the offense 
in March. The questions simply were not neutral and were an attempt 
to illicit from the psychiatrist, Dr. Whitten, that the behavior pattern 
in March, described by Tamara Fay Shields, is the best source to 
examine in determining the mental state at that time. The State, even 
though extensive cross-examination had preceded this questioning, did 
not illicit that from the psychiatrist. 
Obviously no two factual situations are ever identical and 
so case law on the point can do no more than point up specific 
'.nstances. Under the standard set forth by this Court Tuggle, supra, 
:i 
and under the facts and circumstances of this case where insanity was 
1 
the sole defense and really the sole issue it was improper for the 
L ! ,ourt to take such an active role in questioning, when such questions 
' :id not merely clear up issues left unclear but elicited testimony 
- 5 -
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unfavorable to appellant's defense. Appellant submits that such 
questions were calculated to do that and it was not mere happenstan,. 
that the questions made the defense of insanity weaker than it woul: 
have been without such questions. Whatever the merits of appellant' 
defense of insanity, appellant contends that it is not for the tria: 
court to elicit weaknesses as that is the purpose of cross-examinat:: 
Appellant contends that on such a key and vital issue questioning b:' 
the Court was prejudicial to appellant and was error that requires a 
new trial. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OFFERED 
BY APPELLANT FROM LAY WITNESSES. 
Appellant contends that the exclusion from evidence by th: 
Court of lay witness testimony was prejudicial error. In view oft":; 
fact that the Court below established through its own examination(;, 
Point I) that the best way for anyone to judge a person's mental w 
is to look at his behavior, appellant attempted to introduce testirrc 
from lay witnesses as to appellant's behavior pattern at a time clcs 
to the alleged defense than Dr. Whitten was able to observe, and 
appellant also sought to have those witnesses state their opinion as 
to appellant's sanity at the time they were aquainted with him. Th 
acquaintances were much nearer in time to the alleged offense than·, 
the examination of Dr. Whitten and appellant reasoned that the jur:: 
was free to disregard Dr. Whitten's opinion because of the lengthc 
time between the alleged offense and Dr. Whitten's examination. 
Appellant contends that the Court below erred in excluding test: 
- 6 -
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,hich was corroborative of Dr. Whitten' s opinion as the observed 
conduct was consistent with what Dr. Whitten observed and it was 
~uch closer in time than Dr. Whitten's examination. 
Appellant called to the stand Randall Oster who had a 
:laster's Degree in Psychology and was working on his Ph.D. and had 
worked for the Salt Lake County Mental Health Center as a pyschologist 
in the Salt Lake County Jail where appellant was housed at the time of 
~is arrest and thereafter (R. 151, 152). He testified that he had 
interviewed approximately 150 people in the Salt Lake County Jail and 
that he spoke with appellant on July 17 and July 28, 1977. Appellant 
sought to ask the witness about behaviors exhibited and conversations 
I 
: held (R. 154) and the Court then excused the jury and required appellant 
to proffer his testimony. Appellant proffered (R. 164, 165) that Mr. 
Oster had a two hour conversation with the appellant and that appellant 
related a delusional system that was consistent with the delusional 
'i )r. Whitten testified about. The witness would have testified that 
appellant related his need to confess to the offense because the Judge 
:j «as God, the District Attorney was the Son, and the police were the 
d 
3oly Ghost. The witness would have been asked his opinion as to 
1appellant's sanity on July 28, 1977, and from his training and the 
I 
I ~perience in the jail he would testify that he reached a clinical 
:t 
:1 
diagnosis that appellant was a paranoid schizophrenic and was not 
:esponsible for his actions at that time. 
The Court ruled (R. 167, 168) that the proffer was denied 
iecause the witness could not give his opinion as of the state of the 
1ind of the appellant at the time of the offense, in March, 1977. 
Appellant was also required to proffer the testimony of Ron 
- 7 -
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Yengich, who was the attorney appointed to represent the appellant 
shortly after his arrest on May 4, 1977 (R. 171). He would have 
testified that he met appellant five or six days after that date fo 
the Salt Lake County Jail and saw him until the end of July approxi.::, 
15 times. Mr. Yengich would have described appellant's physical cor-
dition and related conversations with appellant. He would have 
testified that appellant related the same delusional system in May·;. 
was described by Dr. Whitten. He would have been asked and given as, 
his opinion that during that period of time appellant was not compete: 
to stand trial and was not responsible for his actions as he was su'.': 
from a mental disease and it affected his ability to conform his conduct to:: 
requirements of the law. The witness would have also testified that 
he instructed appellant on at least ten occasions not to speak wi~ 
police officers and shortly after one of those instructions appellar.: 
confessed to police officers. The Court denied the proffer (R. 174) 
ruling that because the opinion of the lay witness would have bee: 
seven or eight weeks after the offense it was not probative and not 
material as to his mental state on the date of the offense. 
Appellant contends for several reasons that the Court's ri;: 
in requiring a proffer and excluding such testimony from the jury wa' 
prejudicial and reversible error. Dr. Whitten' s testimony was basei 
upon an examination in August, 1977. He was asked to give his opin: 
as to appellant's mental state in March based upon that observation 
He did so. Clearly, the jury could disregard such testimony and 5 ~ 
"that is too big of a leap, while he may have been insane in August 
we do not believe based upon the contact you had with him that you-
- 8 -
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properly tell what he was like in March." Therefore, the lay testimony 
describing behavior consistent with that which was observed by 
or. Whitten was important. Further, the lay witnesses would have given 
:, testimony concerning conversations with appellant that were consistent 
with conversations related to Dr. Whitten. Dr. Whitten was specifically 
cross-examined as to whether or not appellant was "fooling" him (R. 135). 
• Appellant contends that such examination was in essence a challenge to 
, the truthfulness of the statements by appellant that he was suffering 
'1 some kind of delusional system. Under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
'i 63(1) (c) evidence is admissible if it supports testimony made by 
:t the witness when such testimony has been challenged. These prior 
statements by appellant to the lay witnesses were consistent with 
statement related to Dr. Whitten and when Dr. Whitten was challenged 
on the basis of being "fooled" that was a necessary foundation to allow 
testimony by lay witnesses as to prior consistent statements. 
::! More importantly, testimony from the lay witnesses as to 
I 
their opinion of appellant's sanity in July and May, 1977' was admissible 
under almost all cases which have considered the topic. The Court 
' I 
d below admitted that lay witnesses can give their opinion to some-as 
a;1 one's sanity not held that in this case the opinions would have been 
c; 
l:: 
as to appellant's sanity approximately seven weeks after the alleged 
0ffense and approximately four months after the alleged offense. Thus, 
the Court concluded that the opinion was too remote and not probative as 
~the mental state of appellant at the time of the alleged offense. 
Appellant contends that the Court erred in such ruling. The Supreme 
·:ourt of Oregon recognized the problem the defendant faces when an 
'.nsanity defense is asserted. In State v. Gary Mark Gilmore, 410 P.2d 
- 9 -
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240 (Ore., 1966) the Court said: 
Whether or not the defendant was insane is a very 
difficult question to be answered. Insanity is an 
elusive concept. The evidence provided for the jury 
is usually, as it was here, the opinions of the 
experts called by the defendant that the defendant 
could not tell the difference between right and wrong, 
in the opinions of the experts called by the State 
that the defendant could tell the difference between 
right and wrong. With the issue and the evidence so 
incapable of precise measurement, any finding on any 
aspect of ~he defendant's mental condition would be 
relevant and an assistance to the jury in reaching 
its most difficult decision. 
I 
Appellant contends that such statement recognizes the need; 
I 
juries must face in making their decision. That is, any evidence wc •. 1 
be helpful for a determination as to a person's mental state. Whate·:t 
the value of the testimony of the witnesses may have been, it was for I 
the jury's consideration and not the Court's. In Criswell v. State. 
443 P. 2d 552 (Nev., 1968) the Court, citing another Nevada case, sai: 
In this case and in Virtually every other jurisdiction 
in the United States a lay witness (1) having had 
adequate opportunity for observation may (2) after 
stating the facts, (3) give his opinion as to the 
sanity or insanity of the person involved, where-
upon (4) the weight to be given to his testimony 
is a matter for the jury's determination. 
::iuch is the rule in all states surrounding our jurisdictk 
See, for example, People v. Medina, 521 P.2d 1257 (Colo., 1974); ~ 
v. Lujan, 534 P.2d 1112 (N.M., 1975); State v. Robison, 408 P.2d 2~ 
(Ariz., 1965); State v. Odell, 227 P.2d 710 (Wash., 1951); Peop1!.; 
Webb, 300 P.2d 130 (Cal. ,1956). 
While the witnessee were not experts and thus could not be 
asked to relate back to the time of the alleged offense, surely the'.: 
opinions and the behaviors they described between the date of the 
- 10 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alleged offense and the date of an examination by an expert witness 
.,ere irrelevant as that term is used in our law, meaning any evidence 
that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the existence of 
any significant fact. For the Court to rule that such testimony was 
not relevant or material is clearly erroneous; it may or may not have 
been of much worth to the jury but it clearly did bear upon the issue 
of appellant's sanity at the time of the alleged offense. Particularly 
so when coupled with the expert testimony based upon a later observation 
l; consistent in the extreme with the previous observations by lay witnesses. 
I 
Insanity was appellant's only defense. Because of the Court's 
e·,t ruling appellant had to try to meet his burden of proof in showing the 
orl defense of insanity based upon the testimony of one expert witness who 
conducted an examination five months after the alleged offense. There 
i: was helpful evidence in existence and the Court refused to allow the 
.o:.· 
jury to hear such evidence. Because of that erroneous ruling appellant 
was severely prejudice in his defense and is entitled to a reversal 
and a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
~ For the reasons above stated, that the Court below took too 
"! active a role in the questioning of witnesses, and the Court erred in 
0 excluding evidence of appellant's mental state, appellant respectfully 
submits that the Court below should be reversed and the matter remanded 
J< i 
I for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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